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ABSTRACT  
The online world has developed from a source of information to a complex economic and social environment. However, 
many online environments fail to function efficiently due to the lack of reliable reputation and anonymity of users. We 
propose a tradable reputation mechanism and conduct a virtual field experiment, using Second Life as an experimental 
platform, to investigate the role of reputation trading, based on our game theory analysis of the economic influence of 
tradable reputation. We introduce an avatar market that allows users to buy and sell avatars in terms of the reputation. Our 
main theoretical results show that reliable reputation is induced in a separating equilibrium where users are separated based 
on their ability in fulfilling tasks or transactions. We generate five hypotheses to test in the field experiment. We also 
describe a computer system that realizes the proposed mechanism as a basis for the field experiment. 
Keywords  
Reputation, Virtual Worlds, Online Economy, Game Theory, Field Experiment 
INTRODUCTION 
Over the past decades the online world have gone from mainly a source of information to a complex social, economic, and 
entertainment environment such as that of eBay, Amazon, MySpace, Second Life, or World of Warcraft(WoW). The role of 
reputation in facilitating transactions and other voluntary interactions between avatars in the online world is as important as it 
is in the real world. However, the traditional notion of reputation fails to sustain an effective economy and society in many 
online settings due to the anonymity of users. The primary purpose of this study is to propose a tradable reputation 
mechanism with an avatar market to the online world, and conduct a field experiment in a virtual world, Second Life, to 
investigate the role of such a mechanism in establishing reliable reputation. Our goal is to use virtual world as an 
experimental platform to generate insights regarding the pervasive reputation issue in the online world. The field experiment 
is also accompanied by a game theory analysis, which provides a basis for our testable hypotheses in the experiment. 
Field experiments have the advantage of combining the controls of lab experiments and the external validity of behaviors in 
natural settings (Harrison and List 2004, Reiley and List 2007). Experimental economists have intensively examined the 
potentials of virtual environment which visually mimic complex physical space for research on human interactions 
(Bainbridge, 2007, Bloomfield, 2007, Nicklisch and Salz 2008). Our study shows the potential of field experiments for 
research in Information Systems, which concerns a large set of issues regarding online communities, virtual worlds, social 
networks, and electronic commerce. 
Reputation has an important economic function in resolving issues of moral hazard and adverse selections in interactions. For 
example, it can reduce the agency costs for buyers and sellers, and can improve matching of people who are searching for 
friends. Early study shows that reputation rewards people for their high ability in certain aspects, and channel resources into 
the most valuable place(Ba and Pavlou 2002). However, many online environments suffer from the temptation to avatars to 
misbehave, due to the anonymity of users. The main contribution of this study is to propose a market for avatars to establish 
trust and facilitate cooperation. We describe an avatar market as a marketplace where avatar owners exchange the account 
and password of the avatar for money from avatar buyers. It is worth noting that the value of an avatar comes from the 
reputation history associated with the avatars. Avatars are users' online representation of themselves, whether in the form of a 
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three-dimensional model, a two-dimensional icon (picture), or a text construct. Reputation in the online world is closely 
attached to avatars, instead of the real identity of the user. In the context of Second Life, WoW, or eBay, reputation is a 
summary describing users' performance in a certain aspect, such as eBay users' feedback scores. Due to the separability of 
reputation from users, tradable reputation has a great potential in the online world. In fact, we already observe variations of 
buying and selling avatars for reputation. For example, WoW players may go to Accounts.com to trade their accounts for real 
money, while the price depends on the skill levels and experience levels of the account, which is indeed a reputation of the 
user in the WoW context. 
An avatar market benefits an online environment from several aspects. First of all, the avatar market prevents agent from 
misbehaving. In most online environments, avatars are essentially free, which provides opportunities to misbehave without 
bearing reputational consequences. Friedman and Resnick (2001) pointed out a social cost resulting from the nature of free 
avatars. Our theoretical analysis shows that misbehaving will lead to a loss in avatar prices, and when the avatar market is 
properly priced, it is optimal for agents to exert effort and improve reputation of their avatars. Also, an avatar market 
enhances the predictability of reputations by separating different types of agents. We show that a separating equilibrium 
exists in which high type agents will always purchase avatars with high reputation, while low type agents will always 
purchase avatars with low reputation. In other words, reputation in our case becomes a perfect indicator of how capable an 
agent is of providing services. Further, the avatar market deals with the end-of-game effect, since even for their last period of 
providing service, agents will be well motivated by the market value of the avatar. An avatar market also better allocates 
resources and improves efficiency by allowing agents to start with reputation that suits their ability, and avoiding the 
inefficiency of a high-ability newcomer pooling with low-ability newcomers as a new avatar. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we provide a review of related literature, followed by an 
introduction to our economic model of the avatar market for virtual worlds. In the following two sections, we describe system 
development and discuss the implementation of the field experiment and testable hypotheses. We conclude in the last section. 
LITERATURE 
A large body of research has studied reputation (Kreps, Milgrom, Roberts, and Wilson 1982, Fudenberg and Levine 1989, 
1992, Friedman and Resnick 1999, Mailath and Samuelson 2001). In all these studies, reputation is assumed to accumulate 
and update based on the observed outcomes. Different from them, the reputation in our paper is based on auditing and does 
not require observability of agents' history by consumers. On the one hand, this difference changes the information structure 
regarding outcomes and enhances reputation's role in inducing effort as discussed in the introduction. On the other hand, it 
provides a creditable basis for reputation updating. As shown by Dellarocas and Wood (2008), reputation relying on users' 
reports of privately observed outcomes is subject to potential reporting bias. Thus, our paper is positioned to examine the 
impact of the different information and incentive structures as provided by audited reputation. 
The avatar market has been studied in economics as reputation tradings. Mailath and Samuelson (2001) examined the 
situation of reputation replacement where one agent can sell reputation to a group of competitive buyers at the end of a 
period. They focused on the price of reputation as determined by competition. The idea of an avatar market can be viewed as 
a generalization of reputation replacement to multiple sellers and multiple buyers. Tadelis (1999, 2002) raised the notion of 
reputation as a tradeable asset in an overlapping generation setting with two types of agents. The two studies established that 
a market for reputation is sustainable: agents are willing to pay for a high reputation. However, the papers also concluded that 
no equilibrium in the market can sort out the two types of agents. Our current paper differs from Tadelis (1999, 2002) by 
introducing an audit process to reveal partial information regarding service quality before consumption. Our different 
information structure impacts agents' incentive, and we are able to achieve a separation of agents in the avatar market. A 
recent paper Xu et.al (2008) studied a market for manufacturing firms with conventional products to trade their firm names. 
The current paper differs from Xu et.al (2008) in our focus on the online environment and propose a different auditing 
procedure, which leads to a different incentive structure for agents.  
ECONOMICS ANALYSIS OF AN AVATAR MARKET  
Model Setup  
We model the online environment in an infinitely repeated game with three entities: consumers, agents, and an auditor. Both 
consumers and agents are online users, and they assume avatars to perform activities. Agents provide services to consumers, 
such as landscaping, party planning, advertising, or tour guiding. The auditor examines the quality of the services and assigns 
reputation to agents. Agents with higher cost of effort than others are called low types, and we assume the proportion of high 
types is , and their cost coefficient is . Similarly,  of agents are low types with a cost coefficient . We 
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denote effort as , and cost of effort as , . With an effort , the services have a probability of  to be 
successful, and  to be a failure. Consumers are homogeneous and risk-neutral, and benefit with value  from 
successful services and with  from failed services. 
We use a simple reputation system consisting of reputation  and . In each period, the auditor audits each agent with 
probability , and assigns reputation  if the audited outcome is successful, and assigns  if the outcome is a failure.1 We 
study two markets: the avatar market and the service market. The avatar market allows agents to buy and sell their avatars, 
and we denote the price for avatars as  and . We assume that shifts in the avatars' ownership are unobservable to 
consumers, since reputation is only associated to agents' avatars but not to agents as individuals. The service market is for 
trading of services. 
The timeline of events in each period is as follows. First, agents choose their avatars: they may continue with their current 
avatars, buy avatars, or create a new avatar. We assume an avatar with reputation  is free, that is, . Second, agents 
determine their effort to maximize expected payoff. The level of effort is based on the tradeoff between effort cost  and 
expected benefit , where  is consumers' expectation on effort levels of reputation , , . Next, 
the auditor audits agents' services. Agents' payoff is contingent on the audited outcome in the sense that upon a failure in 
audit, the agent receives no payment for the current service. We also assume that demand is greater than supply such that 
consumers pay their expected value  of the service based on reputation. 
Separation  
We will be concerned with steady states, such that agents' effort choices , avatar values , and proportions  are 
independent of time. Agents' objective can be expressed as follows.  
 
 where the first two terms consist of agents' expected profit from services, while the rest represents agents' expected gain in 
avatar value. We further assume . This ensures that neither type of agents will exert the highest effort  
because the marginal cost of effort for both types is higher than the marginal revenue when effort is . The opposite case, 
where both low type and high type agents exert the highest effort, is trivial and not part of the focus of this paper. 
We define a steady-state separating equilibrium that describes the one-to-one correspondence between agents and reputation 
of avatars as follows. 
 Definition: A steady-state separating equilibrium consists of a set of values  such that all the following 
conditions are satisfied.  
(1) , 
(2) , 
(3) , 
(4) . 
                                                           
1We also confine our analysis to services with an outcome that is verifiable by the auditor but is unobservable by consumers. 
If consumers can observe the outcome, reputation becomes unnecessary because consumers pay based on their observations. 
However, it is important for the auditor to verify the outcome, so that the auditor can credibly make changes to reputations 
and enforce a contingent payment contract with agents, based on verification. 
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Conditions (1) and (2) are incentive compatibility conditions to ensure that agents do not deviate to the other type of avatar 
reputation. Condition (3) states that consumers have rational expectation of effort in equilibrium. Condition (4) comes from 
the steady-state requirement that in each period the proportion of high type agents at reputation  is the same. This can also 
be interpreted as the market clearing condition. Intuitively, the number of low type agents who have passed an audit, 
, must be just enough to supply the high type agents who have failed an audit and need to purchase an avatar with 
reputation , which is . 
In the following, we solve for a steady-state separating equilibrium by deriving effort levels of each type of agents and avatar 
prices. 
High Type Agents' Effort and Profit: We first analyze a high type agent, who occupies an avatar with reputation . The 
profit is as follows,  
 
 The optimal effort level  is obtained by the first order condition regarding , together with the fact that  holds 
in equilibrium.  
 
Low Type Agents' Effort and Profit: Here we turn to a low type agent with reputation , whose objective is to solve the 
following maximization problem:  
 
 Similarly, solving for optimal effort level  as well as profit  leads to:  
 
Next, we determine  using the steady state condition. We denote the proportion of high type agents as  and the 
proportion of low type agents as . A steady state equilibrium requires that, at the beginning of each period, there 
are just enough avatars with reputation  for high type agents to start with. In other words, the proportion of avatars with 
reputation  is equal to that of high type agents, or:  
 
Rearranging the above equation leads to  
 
Existence of a separating equilibrium: We now prove the existence of a separating equilibrium with , , ,  by 
showing that agents do not have incentive to deviate to avatars with a different reputation. The existence conditions are 
summarized as follows. 
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 Proposition1: Under the binary reputation mechanism with audit, a steady-state separating equilibrium exists if 
, where . 
The proof is provided in the appendix. It is worth noticing that a large  is crucial for the existence of separation. 
Intuitively,  and  are the essential differences between the two types, and they lead to different incentives and 
consequently different choices of avatars in terms of the reputation. We can imagine that as this essential difference 
diminishes, the two types become the same, and separation becomes impossible or unnecessary. 
SYSTEM IMPLEMENTATION  
With the desirable results from economic analysis, we have developed a computer system to fulfill the proposed reputation 
mechanism featuring the avatar market. The system can be implemented on Second Life, and as a self-sustaining implication, 
it can be easily applied to other online environment. We next describe the system with Unified Modeling Language, 
including one class diagram to show the system structure, and four sequence diagrams to illustrate processes in each part of 
the system. 
System Overview  
The system contains two main parts: the reputation system and the avatar marketplace. The system implemented on Second 
Life interacts with exogenous environments including Second Life and PayPal as the payment method in avatar trading. 
Figure 1 depicts the overview of the system.  
 
The system is written using PHP (PHP Hypertext Preprocessor), which is a cross-platform server-side programming language 
especially suited for Web development. PHP was chosen as the programming language because of its widespread presence in 
the Web industry, and its wide range of program modules that allow for the use of many platform independent increasing 
features. The system is built using Zend Framework 1.5 to increase abstraction and to simplify development. Zend 
Framework requires PHP version 5.1.4 or later. For usability reasons client side programming is done using JavaScript with 
jQuery. jQuery is a lightweight cross-browser JavaScript library that simplifies many JavaScript operations and makes Web 
development easier. 
 
 
Figure 1. Class Diagram 
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The system uses SQL database for data storing, and the database handling is done via Zend Framework. Zend Framework 
uses PDO (PHP Data Objects) which provides lightweight and consistent interface for accessing databases. PDO requires 
version 5.1 PHP interpreter and it supports all commonly used database systems, e.g. MySQL, IBM DB2 and Microsoft SQL 
Server. The system is currently built and tested using MySQL database. 
Avatar Reputation System  
The sequence of actions in the reputation system is described in Figure 2. The main function of the avatar reputation system 
is for auditors to update avatars' reputation based on their audit result. In each predefined time period, avatars are chosen at a 
certain probability, which can be easily set and changed as a system parameter. Our auditors carry out transaction with the 
service providers. They evaluate the service based on their knowledge and experience and update the avatars' reputation 
based on their evaluations. Specifically, avatars' reputation level is numerical. New avatars' reputation is set at 0 by default. 
Avatars' reputation level  s increase with positive evaluations from the auditors, and decrease with negative evaluations.  
 
 
 
 Avatar Marketplace  
The avatar marketplace is described in Figure 3, which provides a safe and secure way for people to buy and sell Second Life 
avatars in terms of the reputation based on the reputation system. People can search for avatars on sale in different categories. 
Only Second Life users can place a selling note. To sell an avatar, the user submits the avatar's name, price, and description 
to the system. The system adds the avatar's reputation from the reputation system to the selling note. When a potential buyer 
wants to purchase an avatar, he/she commits to buying and submits his/her email address to the system. After a purchase 
commitment, the avatar's note will be locked. When the note is locked it cannot be seen by anyone other than the buyer and 
the seller. The notes are locked in order to prevent multiple purchase commitments. Buyer will pay to the system; if payment 
is not received within a certain period of time the note will be unlocked, as depicted in figure 4.  
Figure 2. Sequence Diagram for The Avatar Reputation System 
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When the payment is received, the system will notify the seller and ask for the avatar's password. After receiving the seller's 
password, the system will verify the password's validity.  
 
 
Figure 4. Sequence Diagram for The Marketplace When No Payment Received 
Figure 3. Sequence Diagram for The Marketplace 
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If the password is invalid the money will be sent back to buyer, and the selling note will be deleted; the process is depicted in 
figure 5. If the password is valid the system will transfer the money to the seller, immediately change the password, and send 
the new password to the buyer. Using this procedure transactions are always safe and secure. To protect anonymity, all 
payments will be done using PayPal.  
 
 
 
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN  
The experiments are conducted in Second Life, a virtual world featuring user-performed services and user-created objects. 
Second Life is one of most popular virtual worlds, and is distinct in its resemblance to the real world in terms of the social 
and economic structures. The experiments started in January 2009 and are planned over a 3-month period.  
Description of Second Life  
Second Life is an online virtual world developed by Linden Lab and launched in June, 2003. Users of Second Life, who call 
themselves ``residents'', connect via their personal computer running special software with servers that interchange the 
information between users over the internet. The software simulates a large, complex, three-dimensional environment filled 
with user-created artificial objects, such as houses, high ways, trees, clothes, and most importantly services, such as tour 
guide, freelancing scripter, advertiser, etc. Residents are represented by avatars, which can subjectively walk, fly, swim, or 
dance, and can participate in individual and group activities. Second life has gone far beyond being a community for social 
networking; it is also a fully-functioning economy with its own currency (the Linden Dollar, or L), which can be converted to 
U.S. dollars, businesses, arbitrage opportunities, and recognizable economic trends. Residents can create and trade virtual 
objects and services with one another. With 15 million residents, Second Life has a total Linden Dollar supply of over 5 
billion. In August 2008, more than 15 million transactions took place among the residents. Many other virtual worlds with a 
business context have such economic features. Castronova (2001) studied the macroeconomics of a virtual world called 
``Norrath'' and showed that it had a nominal hourly wage of about $3, and a GNP per capita between that of Russia and of 
Bulgaria. Indeed, as people spend more and more time and money in their business in virtual environments, the economic 
aspect of virtual worlds, although not mature, deserve attention from researchers.  
Figure 4. Sequence Diagram for The Marketplace When The Password is Invalid 
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Method  
For the experiment, subjects will be randomly approached on the streets and be asked whether they would assist us. 
Participants will be offered Linden dollars in exchange for providing effort, that is, to give or take a tour guide for thirty 
minutes. Participants will be randomly assigned the role of tour guide or tourists. Similar tasks will be repeated 10 rounds, 
and avatars' role will not change during the experiment. We will design a set of different tours, and each avatars as tour guide 
will be assigned one tour at random. A one-hour training session will be offered to avatars, so that they can get familiar with 
the tour and also how to give a tour. We then divide tour guides into two equally-sized groups, ``C'' and ``R'' denoting 
controlled groups and regular groups. The following description of experiment applies to both groups, except that group ``C'' 
will not participate in the marketplace for tokens. 
A special numbered token will be designed to indicate a tour guide's performance in the past. For example, a token with a 
number  means a tour guide has a record of successfully addressing all requests and giving a complete tour in  past 
rounds. When tourists come to a guide, they pay a certain amount of linden dollars based on the number on the token. The 
token numbers are essentially an avatar's reputation as a tour guide. We introduce tokens purely for experiment purpose. 
Since our randomly selected subjects are unlikely to be willing to exchange their avatars for our experiment, we can capture 
their behaviors in trading reputations with a token representing their reputation levels. 
Before each round of experiment, tourists will be given a series of requests they can ask the tour guide. Depending on the 
tour guides' familiarity to the tour and their ability to remember the information from the training session, they may or may 
not be able to address the tourists requests. Each tour guide, at the beginning of the experiment, has to click on an object at a 
specified location, and that click will enable a ``detector'' to record a set of activities carried out by the guide in the following 
 minutes. These activities include which spots on the tour that the guide has been to, how long has she stayed in each spot, 
messages exchanged between she and her tourist, etc. These activities will be used to evaluate the avatar's performance as a 
tour guide in this round, and the evaluation result determines whether her token number will increase or decrease by . For 
the purpose of randomization, we use a random evaluation process, meaning each set of activities has a less than one 
probability to be analyzed. Tour guides are notified the random evaluations rule; however, when they are performing service 
in a particular round, they are not aware if their performance are been evaluated. We also alter the probability of evaluation in 
each round, and the probability will be announced to tour guides. It is also worth noting that, despite some sets of activities 
will not be used for evaluation, we still utilize these activity records for testing hypotheses. 
At the end of each round, tour guides will be told to visit a marketplace that enables them to buy and sell tokens with Linden 
dollars, and prices will be determined with a second price sealed bid auction. In other words, tokens will be reallocated at the 
end of each round. When the experiment finishes with all ten rounds, avatars can sell their tokens to the experiment 
organizer. 
A reward scheme will be announced before the experiment. Avatars as tour guides will be rewarded in three parts. They each 
will receive a fixed participation reward at the end of each round, and this reward increases as more rounds going on. 
Besides, they keep the payments from their tourists in each round. Also, they are rewarded through selling their tokens at the 
end of the experiment. 
Hypotheses  
Knowing that a higher token will generate a higher payment from tourists, which consists part of their total reward, there is a 
benefit for all tour guides to purchase a higher token, which leads to a high demand for higher tokens. However, since there is 
a chance that the tour guide is incapable of performing a good tour or addressing all requests, she also faces the risk of 
lowering the token and thus bear a loss in terms of the value of the token. Therefore, we test 
H1: In the marketplace, the price for a higher token is higher than that of a lower token. 
We want to stress the point that the marketplace for tokens, or in other words the marketplace for tour guides' reputation, 
provide disincentive for avatars to shirk, since shirking can potentially decrease tour guides' token, and in turn impact the 
value of token and the payments determined by their tokens. There are various ways of shirking, for example, a tour guide 
may not cover all spots in the tour just to save time, or a tour guide may not address some requests from the tourist. 
Therefore, we will also test 
H2: The average token level in group ``R'' is higher than the average token level in group ``C''. 
Meanwhile, we also recognize an opposite force on tour guides' incentive for effort. Due to our random evaluation process, 
which echoes the random audit procedure widely adopted in real business, tour guides may have incentive to shirk since for a 
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positive probability, they will not get caught. In fact, if the benefit from shirking, meaning the amount of time saved for other 
entertainment, outweighs the expected cost of being caught in evaluation, we expect tour guide to take their chances and 
perform lousy services. Our variation in probability of evaluation provides a basis to test whether the above argument is a 
consideration in tour guides' decision for effort. Therefore, we test 
H3: The average performance in group ``R'' is higher when the announced evaluation probability is high. 
We are also interested in comparing tour guides' reactions when evaluations impact only future payment and when 
evaluations impact both future payment and the value of their tokens. 
H4: Controlling for the announced evaluation probability, the average performance in group ``R'' is higher than in group 
``C''. 
As our theoretical analysis shows, it is possible to achieve a separation in the reputation market based on agents ability levels. 
In our experiment, controlling the token level, a tour guide's performance history as recorded by our ``detector'' is an 
approximation of her ability to perform the service. A separating equilibrium corresponds to the scenario that a tour guide 
with high performance maintains a high token level, while a low-performance tour guide maintains low token level. 
H5: In group ``R'', tour guides' average token level is higher when the average performance level is also high. 
CONCLUSION  
In this study, we proposed a field experiment to examine the impact of an audited reputation and an avatar market on 
sustaining an effective virtual world. We first use a game theory model to describe a virtual world with agents providing 
services to others. We show that, with an avatar market for agents to buy and sell avatars in terms of the reputation, agents 
can be separated based on their abilities in providing services, and meanwhile they are motivated to exert effort to keep their 
avatars' reputation in good standing. Our main theoretical finding is that the avatar market promotes reliable reputation with a 
proper pricing scheme. 
We then developed and described an application based on our theoretical results to implement audited reputation and an 
avatar market. The application contains a reputation mechanism to keep track of avatars' reputation, and a marketplace that 
supports buying and selling of avatars in terms of the reputation. The application is developed as a self-sustained program 
and can be implemented in different virtual worlds. 
Based on our economic model and system implementation, we are currently conducting a 3-month field experiment in 
Second Life. We have generated five hypotheses to examine the impact of tradable reputation on avatars' incentive to exert 
effort, the impact of audit on avatars' incentive for effort, as well as the separability of the market. 
Overall, our study shows the potential of field experiments for research on virtual worlds, online communities, and social 
networks. Field experiments in virtual world environment allow the analysis of economic activities in the field controlling for 
important factors like social embeddedness. Therefore, our field experiment will, hopefully, be the starting point for further 
research in virtual worlds, providing Information Systems researchers with better understanding on the interaction between 
reputation, audit, and virtual worlds performance. 
APPENDIX  
Proof to Proposition 1. For high type agents, knowing consumers' belief  and , they must prefer reputation  to . 
Denote  and  as optimal effort and profit if a high type agent chooses reputation  instead, and we have  
 
High type agent will not deviate to  if the profit from  is higher, and this condition requires , or  
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 Define  and . Given , we have . It is easy to verify 
that . We therefore simplify the above inequality into  
 
Similarly, we define  and  for low type agents.  
 
 For  to be greater than , the following condition must be satisfied,  
 
Even under existence, we also need to verify that equilibrium parameters, especially the effort levels are within the range 
. It is easy to see that both high and low effort are positive. To ensure they are also no greater than , we need  
 
 Thus, only solutions  satisfying conditions (1), (2), and (3) are supported as a separating equilibrium. 
Recall that . It thus follows that (3) is satisfied.  
Solving (1) for , we obtain the following,  
 
Similarly solving for (2), we obtain the second condition as  
 
To summarize, if , a steady-state separating equilibrium exists under the 
binary reputation mechanism with audit. Proposition 1 proved. 
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